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A STATE'S POWER OF DEFENSE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
FRANCIS X. CON WAYt
WHEN, during the latter part of 1940, the National Guard was
ordered into federal service, the several states formed guard units
for the purpose of supplying a domestic defense force which would take
the place of the National Guard.' The scope of this paper is restricted
to an examination of the constitutional basis for the organization of
such units by the several states and the extent to which they are, or in
the future may be, subject to the control of the National Government.2
Congress has already sanctioned the organization of these defense
units by the states It may, therefore, appear to be somewhat of a work
of supererogation or a mere indulgence in rhetoric to attempt to search
out the limits of state and federal power in a matter such as the writer pro-
poses to examine, especially in times of threatened danger such as these
when military necessity is the guiding principle of action. However, the
precise constitutional problem seems never to have been completely
adjudicated. It involves the militia clauses of the Constitution. Un-
certainty concerning the extent of the grant of power contained in these
clauses, in addition to the timeliness of the subject matter, would seem
to warrant a re-examination of these and related provisions of the Consti-
tution, even though it may be found that the problem does not admit of an
entirely definitive solution.
The provisions of the Constitution which will be principally discussed
(their pertinency will appear later) are the following:
t Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. State guard organizations during the last war were formed in 27 states, and reached
a total strength of 79,000. See SEN. REP. No. 2138, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 3. They
were issued such equipment and supplies as could be spared by the War Department under
authority conferred by the Act of June 14, 1917, 40 STAT. 181. Grounds of military
secrecy would seem to suggest an abstention from publication of any detailed statistics on
existing state guard establishments. It is permissible, however, to mention that legislation
in many states authorizes the governor to organize guard units. For typical statutes see
N. Y. MImTARY LAW, § 5a (1917) and PA. STAT. ANNO. (Purdon, 1930) title 51, § 171.
A uniform state guard act has been drafted and is discussed in Bacon, The Model State
Guard Act (1941) 10 FORDIA L. REv. 41. This act had been adopted by 27 states,
according to Interstate Commission on Crime-Annual Report of the President (Sept. 1941).
2. No attempt is made in this article to consider restrictions upon state action contained
in the various constitutions of the individual states. Only limitations under the United
States Constitution are discussed.
3. 39 STAT. 198, 32 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1916) as amended by 54 STAT. 1206, 32 U. S. C. A.
§ 194 (Supp. 1940). See notes 28 and 29, infra.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The Congress shall have power: . . .
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; 4
To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, reserving to the states, respectively, the ap-
pointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia,
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ...
No state shall, without consent of Congress, . . . keep troops or
ships of war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay.6
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed by law.'
The militia referred to in the quoted clauses of the Constitution was
an institution of early Anglo-Saxon origin which existed in the colonies
at the time of the Revolution as an integral part of the political institu-
tions of the day. It will be unnecessary in this paper to touch on the his-
torical aspects of the militia, except to advert to certain outstanding
features which must have been present in the minds of those who framed
the Constitution.' From the earliest times in England the militia con-
sisted of all men capable of bearing arms. Statutory definitions usually
excluded those outside certain age limits (for instance, 16 to 60) but it
has been pointed out elsewhere9 that the sole reason for this was to exempt
from the duty of bearing arms those obviously not fitted to serve, at least
in the first instance. All members of the militia were under the duty of
supplying themselves with suitable arms and this obligation was enforced
by, a periodic muster and inspection known as the "assize of arms".
However, while all men capable of bearing arms were enrolled and hence
liable to service, the practice grew up, especially in times of threatened
danger, of embodying, either by voluntary enlistment or conscription,
4. U. S. CONS?. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
5. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 16.
6. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
7. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. II.
8. On English militia generally see 1 BL. CoMM. (Jones' ed. 1916) 409-414; Ansell,
Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 471; 2 TAYLOR, THE
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1889) 194-198; MAITLAND, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1926) 276-279, 455-459; 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRIT-
ANNICA (14th ed. 1929) 483-486.
9. Ansell, supra, note 8.
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only a select group of men from the general militia who, on that account,
could be more efficiently trained. These were known as the "trained" or
"train" bands and represent the prototype of what today we call the
organized, as distinguished from the unorganized or reserve, militia.
Another aspect of the English militia system which is noteworthy is the
fact that it was designed primarily for defense, rather than for offensive
action. The basic territorial unit was the county or shire and its principal
function was the maintenance of order, if necessary, and local defense.
Early statutes specifically provided that the members of the militia could
not be compelled to go out of their shires,1" and under an act of Parlia-
ment, passed one year prior to the convening of our Constitutional Con-
vention, the members of the militia could not be ordered out of their
county unless in case of urgent necessity certified to by Parliament and
could not be sent out of the kingdom under any circumstances."
The various legislative enactments and other historical documents of
colonial days leave no doubt that it was one and the same institution
which existed in England and the American colonies, based upon the same
general principles of assize of arms.' Every able-bodied male in each
colony was included and the obligation to supply himself with suitable
arms applied to each. The colonies had their "train" bands and the
colonial militia furnished the Minute Men of 1775. When the time ar-
rived for the formation of a more perfect union of the states which had
recently won their freedom from the mother country, the part to be
played by the militia in the new scheme of government was treated as a
matter of essential importance by the Founding Fathers. 3 The right
of the people to bear arms for the common defense was as much a part
of their Anglo-Saxon heritage as the right to trial by jury, and the
only alternative to citizen soldiery was the much-feared standing army,
the king's maintenance of which in the colonies during times of peace
10. 1 EDW. III (1327) c. 2; 4 HEN. IV (1402) c. 13 at p. 434.
11. 26 GEO. III. (1786) c. 107 at p. 860.
12. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, Part 2, ch. XIII;
OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (4 vols. 1924) passim;
2 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY (4 vols. 1936) 186; Wallace,
Legislation in Virginia Regulating the Enrolling and Training of the Militia (1918) 5 VA.
L. REV. 525; Scisco, Evolution of Colonial Militia in Maryland (1940) 35 MARYLAND HIST.
MAGAZINE 166; United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 171 (1938); Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U. S. 366 (1918).
13. Under the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. VI, § 4, the States were prohibited from
keeping up "any body of forces", but it was expressly provided that "every State shall
always keep a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered."
1942]
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was one of the grievances leading to the revolt of the colonies."'
, The record of the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention dis-
closes considerable conflict among the delegates on the question of con-
ferring control over the militia upon the National Government." In the
plan submitted by Pinckney, Congress was empowered both "to pass
laws for arming organizing and disciplining the Miltia of the United
States" and "to call forth the aid of the Militia". However, in the
report of the Committee of Detail the first power was omitted."0 There-
upon, Mason, after expressing the opinon that "thirteen States will never
concur in any one system, if disciplining of the Militia be left in their
hands", moved that Congress be given power "to make laws for the
regulation and discipline of the Militia of the several States reserving
to the States the appointment of the officers". General Pinckney agreed
that uniformity was essential and instanced "serious mischiefs" during the
war owing to dissimilarity in the state militias, while Madison ventured
the opinion that the regulation of the militia naturally appertained to the
authority charged with the public defense and that it did not seem in its
nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities. Ellsworth, how-
ever, thought that Mason's proposal went too far and that the whole
authority over the militia ought not to be taken from the states "whose
consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of power",
adding that he thought "it must be vain to ask the States to give the
Militia out of their hands". Dickinson thereupon proposed "to restrain
the general power to one fourth part af a time, which by rotation would
discipline the whole Militia". This latter proposal fitted in with an earlier
suggestion made by Mason that if the states would not surrender power
over the whole militia, they probably would over a part as a select militia
and he, therefore, withdrew his original motion and moved a power "to
make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia, not exceeding one
tenth part in any one year, and reserving the appointment of officers to
the States". Butler, Pinckney, Langdon and Madison opposed this
amendment and renewed Mason's original proposal. At this juncture
Sherman made the observation that the states might want their militia
for defense against invasion and insurrection and for enforcing obedience
to their own laws, saying "They will not give up this point. In giving
14. DECLARATION OF InDEPENDENCE.
15. The debates in the federal and state conventions bearing upon the militia clauses
are collected by Prof. Scott in SEN. Doc. No. 695, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917).
16. 3 FARRANnD, THE REcoDs oF THE FEDERAL CONSTiTUTtON OF 1787 (rev. ed. 1937) 598;
2 FARAND, id. at 182.
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up that of taxation, they retain a concurrent power of raising money for
their own use." Gerry agreed that this was the last point remaining to
be surrendered: "If it be agreed to by the Convention, the plan will have
as black a mark as was set on Cain." Mason acted upon Sherman's
suggestion and offered a further amendment to his motion to except
therefrom "such part of the Militia as might be required by the States
for their own use.' 7
Mason's original motion and the motion in the form amended by him
were submitted to a Grand Committee of Eleven, which reported the
clause as it now reads in the Constitution."8 Before a vote was taken,
Ellsworth remarked that the word "discipline" was of vast extent and
might be so expounded as to include all power on the subject. In an
apparent effort to reassure him, King, who was a member of the committee
which reported the clause, declared that "by organizing the Committee
meant, proportioning the officers and men-by arming, specifying the
kind size and caliber of arms-and by disciplining prescribing the manual
exercise evolutions etc." After some further debate during which Luther
Martin opposed the clause as reported and Randolph and Madison spoke
in favor of it, again stressing the need for uniformity, a vote was taken
and the clause passed. 9
These proceedings and discussions in the Convention are set forth at
some length because, as bearing upon the problem under examination,
they evidence a strong sentiment among many of the delegates against
placing too great control of the militia in the Federal Government.2 0
It would seem safe to say that, at least as conceived by those who took
part in framing the Constitution, whatever control over the militia the
primordial compact gave to Congress constituted, by way of compromise,
a grant by the people of the states solely for the sake of placing at the
disposal of Congress a unified force for the three purposes stated in the
Constitution. The late war with England had disclosed the defects
17. These discussions took place in the August 18th session of the Convention and are
recorded in 2 FARRAND, 321-333.
18. Except that the words "to provide" are in the Constitution where the words "to
make laws" were in the report. 2 FARA N, 352.
19. These final discussions and the vote took place during the August 23rd session.
2 FAiuAN, 384-388.
20. Kent cites an early instance of jealousy on the part of the colonists of the exercise
of any power (other than that by the local governments) over the militia: when in 1693
the people of Connecticut fearlessly and successfully resisted the claim of Governor Fletcher
of New York, resting on a commission for that purpose from the king to the exclusive
command of the Connecticut militia. 1 KENT, CoMM. (14th ed. 1896) 263.
1942]
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resulting from lack of uniformity in organization, equipment and training
and all but the most rabid anti-Federalists conceded the necessity for
Congressional guidance to this extent. But that thereby the states were
to surrender their sovereign right to maintain a militia for their own
purposes seems an inference which those who participated in the Conven-
tion could hardly have drawn.
In the public discussions preceding the adoption of the Constitution,"'
the most convincing case for federal control of the militia was placed
upon the ground that such a disposition would render unnecessary the
maintenance of a large standing army in time of peace. Throughout
English history the standing army was distrusted as perilous to the rights
of freemen just as the militia was prized and cherished as the palladium
of liberty,22 and without doubt the reluctance to grant Congress power to
raise and support a regular army was to a great degree overcome by the
thought that the availability of a well-trained militia would render need-
less any extensive exercise of the power. 3 In fact two of the strongest
21. Much of the argument advanced against the militia clauses in the state conventions
does not directly bear upon the problem considered in this paper. However, as pertinent
to the present inquiry, the following extracts from the debate in the Virginia Convention
are interesting: Patrick Henry: "If they [Congress] neglect or refuse to discipline or arm
our militia they will be useless: the states can do neither-this power being exclusively
given to Congress." Madison: "This [the militia clause] I conceive to be an additional
security to our liberty without diminishing the power of the states in any considerable
degree .... Congress ought to have the power to establish a uniform discipline throughout
the states, and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasions: these are the only cases wherein they can interfere with the militia." George
Mason: "Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and dis-
ciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive
right to arm them." Madison: "I cannot conceive that this Constitution, by giving the
general government the power of arming the militia, takes it away from the state govern-
ments. The power is concurrent and not exclusive." 3 ELrior's DEBATES (1836) at pp.
52, 90, 378-382, respectively. An argument similar to that expressed by Henry and Mason
was made by Luther Martin in an address delivered to the Maryland legislature, entitled
Genuine Information, 3 FARANm, 209.
22. 1 BL. Comm. op. cit. supra note 8 at ch. 13; 1 CooLEY's, CONSTITUTIONAL LnInITA-
TIONS (8th ed. 1927) 729.
23. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 12 grants Congress power "to raise and support armies."
Towards the close of the Convention (on September 2nd.) Mason being sensible that the
absolute prohibition of standing armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at
the same time to insert something pointing out and guarding against the danger of them,
moved to preface the clause giving Congress power to provide for organizing the militia
with the following words: "And that the liberties of the people may be better secured
against the danger of standing armies in time of peace." Randolph and Madison were in
favor of the motion, but Gouveneur Morris opposed it as setting a dishonorable work of
distinction on the military class of citizens, and upon a vote the motion was defeated.
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champions of a regular army, Hamilton and Madison, went so far as to
make persuasive pleas in The Federalist for the grant of power to Con-
gress to raise a standing army on the premise that the militia of the seve-
ral states would be adequate protection against any encroachment by the
Federal Government through its use of a regular army. 5
If further evidence were needed to prove that it was the sense of those
who framed the Constitution, as well as of those who voted for its adop-
tion, that the people of the several states, in surrendering limited control
over the militia to the Federal Government, did not intend to deprive
the states of their sovereign right to maintain their own militia for their
own purposes, the adoption of the Second Amendment, immediately after
the ratification of the Constitution, would seem to furnish it. Bearing
in mind that the first ten amendments were enacted out of an apprehen-
sion that the Constitution did not sufficiently safeguard in express terms
the fundamental rights of the people and also that these amendments
were designed to leave no doubt concerning the limits of power in the
National Government, the conclusion seems inescapable that the people,
through the instrumentality of the Second Amendment, intended to make
unambiguous the reservation to the states of their inherent right of self-
defense.26
Within recent years, however, the contention has been advanced that
2 MADisoN's, PAPERS (Hunt ed. 1910) 374; 3 MADISON'S, PAPERS (Gilpin ed. 1841) 1578.
4 FARRAND, 59. See also United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939) and BURDIcK,
TnE LAW or TnE Aa RicAc CONSTITUTION (1922) 376.
24. The eleventh article of Hamilton's plan of government submitted to the Convention
on June 18th reads: "No State to have any f6rces land or Naval; and the Militia of all
the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of
which to be appointed and commissioned by them." 1 FARRAND, 293.
25. In TnE FEDERALIST No. 28, Hamilton asked:
"When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army
capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire,
who are in a situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures
for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations?"
HAmILTON, JAY AND MADIsON, TaE FEDERALIST (Smith, Rev. ed. 1901) 147. In THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, Madison after estimating the probable size of a standing army to be
25,000 said: ".... To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million
of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fight-
ing for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their
affections and confidence. It may well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced
could ever be ctnquered by such a proportion of regular troops." Id. at 262. See 2 TUCKER,
THE CONSTITUTION or Tax UNITED STATES (1899) 584-587.




Congress has power to prohibit the maintenance of military units, such
as state guard organizations, not a part of the organized militia (i.e. the
National Guard) as constituted by Congress." As a matter of fact, in
1916 as part of the National Defense Act Congress enacted a statute
which specifically provides that no state may maintain troops in time of
peace other than as organized in accordance with the organization pre-
scribed by Congress in respect to the National Guard.28 This statute, it is
true, not only provides that it shall not be construed as limiting the rights
of the states in the use of the National Guard in time of peace but also
specifically excepts from its provisions the maintenance of state police or
constabulary. Congress may well have inserted these provisions out of a
realization that its powers did not extend that far. However, it would
seem that the same cannot be said of a recently enacted amendment to the
statute 9 by which Congress has expressly authorized organization and
maintenance by the states of military forces other than the National
Guard while the latter is in active federal service. If the states have the
right to organize their own defense or guard units without Congressional
permission, then it appears that in this instance Congress has attempted to
assert an authority which it does not possess. Some of the states may have
27. This in substance appears to be the view which has been taken by the Judge Advo-
cate General. Op. JAG (1917) 180; Op. JAG (1919) 588; Op. JAG (1919) 720, 721, quoted
in SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW AND DEFENSE LEGISLATION (1941). Also see Wiener, The
Militia Clause of the Constitution (1940) 54 HARv. L. REv. 181, 215-217 and Bacon, supra
note 1 at 45.
28. "Maintenance of other troops by States and Territories. No state shall maintain
troops in time of peace other than as authorized in accordance with the organization pre-
scribed under this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this title shall be construed
as limiting the rights of the States and Territories in the use of the National Guard within
their respective borders in time of peace: Provided further, That nothing contained in this
title shall prevent the organization and maintenance of State police or constabulary." 39
STAT. 198, 32 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1916).
29. ". . . Provided further, That under such regulations as the Secretary of War may
prescribe for discipline in training, the organization by and maintenance within any state
...of such military forces other than National Guard as may be provided by the laws
of such State or Territory is hereby authorized while any part of the National Guard of
the State ... concerned is in active Federal Service: Provided further, That such forces
shall not be called, ordered, or in any manner drafted, as such, into the military services
of the United States; however, no person shall, by reason of his membership in any such
unit, be exempted from military service under any Federal law: And provided further, That
the Secretary of War in his discretion and under regulations determined by him, is
authorized to issue, from time to time, for the use of such military units, to any State ...
upon requisition of the Governor thereof, such arms and equipment as may be in possesssion
of and can be spared by the War Department". 39 STAT. 198 (1916) as amended 54 STAT.
1206 (1940).
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sought this legislation because in doubt of their power in the matter and
the states may also have conformed their organizations to the regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of War for the purpose of obtaining the arms
and equipment provided for in the statute." Nevertheless the question
remains whether Congressional approval is required by the states in order
that they may organize their own forces for defense.31
The language of the statute would lead one to believe that the statute
may have been originally intended to implement that clause of the Con-
stitution which prohlbits the states from keeping troops in time of peace
without Congressional consent. 2 In the first place it is clear from the
very wording of the prohibition that it does not apply in time of war.
Moreover, it seems to be well-established that the word "troops", as
used in this clause, was intended to refer exclusively to professional sol-
diers, regularly maintained, paid and equipped by the state. A state
court decision to this effect, which has frequently been cited with ap-
proval, is Dunne v. People,33 in which the court said:
30. 86 CONG. RmC. 9846, 13375, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940); M¢essage of Governor of
New York, Jan. 8, 1941, quoted in SCHLLER, op. cit. supra, note 27.
31. The constitutionality of the amendment does not appear to have received any con-
sideration in the House discussion, the amendment merely having been viewed as necessary
legislation in order to permit the Secretary of War to make equipment available to the state
organizations. 86 CONG. REc. id. at 12873-12874, 13552 (Sept. 30 and Oct. 14, 1940).
In the Senate debate, however, Senator Adams strenuously objected to the amendment as
unconstitutional on the ground that the state's right to maintain a militia for its own de-
fensive purposes belongs to the state as a right which antedated the Constitution and which
was in no way limited or restricted by the Constitution when it was adopted. 86 CONG.
REc. id. at 13375-13380, 13417-13420 (Oct. 8 and 9, 1940). The question of the constitution-
ality of the section was raised in Sweetser v. Emerson, 236 Fed. 161, 168 (C. C. A., 1st
1916), (1916) 30 HA~v. L. REv. 176, 712, but the court did not deem it necessary to decide
that question.
32. See note 6, supra.
33. 94 Ill. 120, 138, 34 Am. Rep. 213, 226 (1879); State ex rel. Madigan v. Wagener,
74 Minn. 518, 77 N. W. 424 (1898) ; see BuRDICK, op. cit. supra, note 23 at 444. But see
Smith v. Wanser, 68 N. J. L. 249, 258, 52 Atl. 309, 312 (1902) which is in accord with
Dunne v. People, in holding that organized militia are not troops. Yet its obiter assumption
that any military force maintained by a state in time of peace, other than the organized
militia (the National Guard of New Jersey), would be troops within the constitutional
prohibition seems unwarranted and disregards the fundamental distinction between troops
and citizen soldiers pointed out above. Wiener, supra, note 27, makes the observation that
it may well be doubted whether the National Guard of today can be said not to be troops.
Whether soldiers are militia or troops within the meaning of the Constitution should not
depend upon their designation but upon the fact whether they are citizen or professional
soldiers and also upon the purpose for which they are organized. This may, undoubtedly,
involve a mere difference in degree, for a state military force may be so regularly main-
tained, paid and supported as a distinctly military establishment as to take on the character
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
"Our understanding is, the organization of the active militia of the State
conforms exactly to the definitions usually given of militia. Lexicographers and
others define militia, and so the common understanding is, to be 'a body of armed
citizens trained to military duty, who may be called out in certain cases, but may
not be kept on service like standing armies, in time of peace.' That is the case
as to the active militia of this State. The men comprising it come from the
body of the militia, and when not engaged at stated periods in drilling and other
exercises, they return to their usual avocations, as is usual with militia, and are
subject to call when the public exigencies demand it. Such an organization, no
matter by what name it may be designated, comes within no definition of 'troops',
as that word is used in the Constitution. The word 'troops' conveys to the
mind the idea of an armed body of soldiers, whose sole occupation is war or
service, answering to the regular army. The organization of the active militia
of the State bears no likeness to such a body of men. It is simply a domestic
force as distinguished from regular 'troops', and is only liable to be called into
service when the exigencies of the State make it necessary."
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted the distinction in
speaking of the Second Amendment:
"The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in
contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent
of Congress. The sentiment of the times strongly disfavored standing armies;
the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be
secured through the Militia-civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion."
34
In addition, the context of the clause in which the restriction is found
lends support to the conclusion that the "troops" alluded to in the Con-
stitution are regular professional soldiers. The war power was vested
exclusively in the National Government by the Constitution and hence it
was appropriate that all war-like attributes, such as the right to maintain
a standing army, should be denied to the states.3 5  The prohibitory
clause, therefore, has no application to the problem with which we are
concerned in this paper, namely, whether the states may, by virtue of
their own authority, maintain a citizen-soldiery, designed, not for offen-
sive warfare, but solely for the defense of the state itself.
of professional soldiery. So far as this writer is aware, it has never been seriously argued
that the constitutional restriction upon the states applied to those bodies of police or con-
stabulary (for example, the Texas Rangers) regularly paid and maintained by the states
solely for the purpose of enforcing the law and preserving domestic order, even though
they may often be designated as "troops" or "troopers." The purpose for which such forces
are maintained would prevent their being considered as troops within the constitutional
prohibition, even though they may be military in appearance and organization.
34. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939).
35. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 381 (1918).
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However, the main argument of those who contend that the state may
maintain no military forces for defensive purposes other than the
militia organized by Congress is posited upon a basis more subtle and in-
tricate than the one just considered. The contention, it would appear,
amounts to this: Congress is given the exclusive power to provide for
organizing the militia and this power includes the power to provide how
it shall not be organized. Congress, therefore, may provide that the
militia organized by it shall be the only militia.3 6 Apparently this con-
clusion is intended to apply in time of peace or war.
By way of parenthesis it should be pointed out that, while the word
"militia" has most frequently been used to comprehend all the arms-
bearing male population, historically it has never been thought to include
within its scope the distaff side of the population. Consequently, the
claim could hardly be made that Congressional approval would be re-
quired for the state to organize a force composed of females (a sort of
Women's Auxiliary Corps) to aid in its own defense, for the Constitution
apparently did not authorize Congress to constitute an entirely new
kind of militia, but merely to organize the militia as it was then under-
stood.
In order to allow the fullest effect to the argument as presented, it
may be conceded that the word "militia" was used in the Constitution in
its broadest signification 37 and that theoretically Congress has power to
legislate into the organized militia the whole manpower of the State
capable of bearing arms. What power has Congress over that militia?
It has been empowered to provide (i.e. makes laws) for organizing, arm-
ing and disciplining that body of men. Attention has already been called
to the meaning, which the committee of -the Convention, which drafted the
militia clauses in that form, ascribed to the words.3" As regards "organiz-
ing", this connotation seems to accord substantially with the popular
one. 9 Details of organization may be many and varied, but in general
it would appear that Congress was empowered to enact legislation calling
for the arrangement by the several states of their potential manpower into
36. N6te 27 supra.
37. Opinion of the Justices, 14 Gray 614 (Mass. 1860); Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387,
396 (1862); Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238 (1863); Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt.
(57 Va.) 470, 475 (1864) ; Ex parte McCants, 39 Ala. 107, 113 (1863); Ansell, supra note 8,
at 475, 479.
38. Supra, p. 173.
39. See Ftux1K & WVAGNALLS, NEW STANDARD DicnioNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1930) ; see also, Acker v. Bell, 62 Fla. 108, 113, 57 So. 356, 358 (1911), for a definition of
"organization" as applied to the military.
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such tactical units as Congress should deem most appropriate and ef-
fective according to the prevailing military opinion of the time. Such
units were to remain essentially a state force, to be trained by the states
"according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." From a practical
standpoint any organization to be effective and worthwhile would have
to be selective and in this respect, more than any other, the first organi-
zation of the militia attempted by Congress in the "notorious Militia Act
of 1792" was deficient and doomed to failure.4" It did not result in the
"well-regulated militia" which was deemed "necessary to the security
of a free state." Whether or not from a legal viewpoint the legislation
might be considered as an exercise by Congress of its power in all its
plentitude, in a practical sense it did not constitute a completely effec-
tive instrument of organization. Accordingly most of the states attempt-
ed through legislation to perfect their own organization by selecting from
the great body of the militia, as constituted by Congress, a limited num-
ber of men who could thereby be more efficiently armed, equipped and
trained.4 Such bodies of men eventually became commonly known as the
"National Guard" of the particular state.
The right of the states to enact any such legislation was very soon
thereafter challenged in the early case of Houston v. Moore4 2 The pre-
cise question presented in that case ,was whether it was competent for a
court-marshal, deriving its jurisdiction under state legislation, to try and
punish militiamen called by the President into the service of the United
States, who refused or neglected to obey the call. The majority of the
Supreme Court held that the legislation providing for the trial and punish-
ment was valid." However, there was a lack of concurrence in all of
40. See Wiener, supra note 27, at 187.' THE MiuTA ACT OF 1792, 1 STAT. 271 (1792)
provided that every able bodied man between 18 and 45 (with exceptions not now material)
should be enrolled in the militia and required to arm and equip himself at his own expense.
It fixed the organization, the armament and the rules of discipline, but left to the legislators
of the states the arrangement of the militia of each state into divisions, brigades, regiments,
battalions and companies. This was the only organization prescribed by Congress until
the passage of the Dick Act, 32 STAT. 776, 32 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1903) more than a century
afterwards and not long after the enactment of the Act of 1792 its provisions became obso-
lete and worthless. For a description of the subsequent legislation down to the present
time, see, Wiener, id.
41. See, Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120, 34 Amer. Rep. 213 (1879) cited supra, note 33;
and People ex rel. Leo v. Hill, 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789 (1891).
42. 5 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1820).
43. In substance the majority held that it was not intended by Congress that the militia-
men be engaged in the service of the United States until they reached the place of rendezvous,
and that there was no law of Congress which excluded the states from jurisdiction to punish
the militia before that time.
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the reasoning by which the decision was reached. Washington, J., de-
livered the principal opinion, Johnson, J., concurred in a separate opinion,
and Story, J., delivered a dissenting opinion in which another member of
the court concurred. The case has become well-known, not because of
the actual decision, but because of the pronouncements made by the
members of the Court on the broad question of the competency of the
states to legislate on a subject, such as the militia, where the Constitution
has empowered Congress to legislate on the subject and such power has
been exercised. Let us begin an analysis of the opinions by quoting from
the dissenting opinion of Justice Story, because it contains language which
fairly describes the concurrent (perhaps "subordinate" would be a better
word) power of legislation which the states have over their own militia:
"It is almost too plain for argument, that the power here given to congress
over the militia, is of a limited nature, and confined to the objects specified iii
these clauses; and that in all other respects, and for all other purposes, the
militia are subject to the control and government of the state authorities....
"Nor does it seem necessary to contend, that the power 'to provide for organiz-
ing, arming and disciplining the militia', is exclusively vested in congress. It
is merely an affirmative power, and if not, in its own nature, incompatible with
the existence of a like power in the states, it may well leave a concurrent power
in the latter. But when once congress has carried this power into effect, its
laws for the organization, arming and discipline of the militia, are the supreme
law of the land; and all interfering state regulations must necessarily be
suspended in their operation. It would certainly seem reasonable, that in the
absence of all interfering provisions by congress on the subject, the state should
have authority to organize, arm and discipline their own militia. The general
authority retained by them over the militia would seem to draw after it these,
as necessary incidents. If congress should not have exercised its own power, how,
upon any other construction, than that of a concurrent power, could the states
sufficiently provide for their own safety against domestic insurrections, or the
sudden invasion of a foreign enemy? They are expressly prohibited from
keeping troops or ships of war, in time of peace; and this, undoubtedly, upon
the supposition, tfiat in such cases, the militia would be their natural and suffi-
cient defense."'44
However, Justice Story's statement, just quoted, did not directly touch
upon the question whether Congressional legislation, such as the Militia
Act of 1792, precluded the states from enacting their own legislation, in
their own interest, for the purpose of improving upon the organization
ordained by Congress. Justice Washington, in the opinion he gave, was
most emphatic in denying that the states had this power. He took the
44. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 50-51 (U. S. 1820).
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position that, in enacting the Militia Act of 1792, Congress had exercised
its power to legislate on that subject as fully as it thought proper, even
though, from the practical view, the legislation might be considered inade-
quate. The Congressional and state legislation might not, in their terms
or in their operation, be contradictory; none the less, in his opinion, the
state legislation would be invalid. He said:
".. . I am altogether incapable of comprehending how two distinct wills can,
at the same time, be exercised in relation to the same subject, to be effectual,
and at the same time, compatible with each other. If they correspond in every
respect, then the latter is idle and inoperative; if they differ, they must, in the
nature of things, oppose each other, so far as they do differ."145
On this aspect of the question, Justice Story did not wholly agree, because
we find him saying:
"There is this reserve, however, that in cases of concurrent authority, where
the laws of the states and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on
the same subject, those of the Union, being 'the supreme law of the land', are
of paramount authority, and the state laws, so far, and so Jar only, as such
incompatibility exists, must necessarily yield."1
46
Justice Johnson, on this broad issue, seemed more in agreement with
Justice Story than with Justice Washington. He said:
"But it is contended, that if the states do possess this power over the militia,
'they may abuse it. This is a branch of the exploded doctrine, that within the
scope in which congress may legislate, the states shall not legislate. That they
cannot, when legislating within that ceded region of power, run counter to the
laws of congress, is denied by no one; but, as I before observed, to reason against
the exercise of this power, from the possible abuse of it, is not for a court of
justice. '47
Even should we allow Justice Washington's assumption that the
Militia Act of 1792 was intended by Congress to represent a full exercise
of its legislative power (and such an assumption is debatable)," his
sweeping generalization to the apparent effect that the states were "ipso
facto" evluded from all power of legislation in reference to the militia
requires further scrutiny. It will be unnecessary to become involved in
a discussion of the distinctions between the so-called exclusive and con-
45. Id. at 21-24.
46. Id. at 49-50 (Italics added).
47. Id. at 45.
48. See Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120, 34 Am. Rep. 213 (1879) cited supra note 33;
Wiener, supra, note 27 at 187, remarks that, after the passage of the Act, Washington con-
tinued to recommend militia legislation as though none had passed.
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current powers of legislation under the Constitution and no attempt will
be made to fit the militia clauses into any of the suggested classifications."
For present purposes it seems sufficient to point out that in a somewhat
related field state legislation has been sustained, even where it covers a
subject within the "exclusive" domain of Congress, upon which that body
has legislated. In Gilbert v. Minnesota50 the Supreme Court sustained
a conviction under a state statute making it unlawful "for any person in
any public place.., to advocate or teach.., that men should not enlist
in the military or naval forces of the United States", even though the
matter seemed to have been fully covered by Congress in the Espionage
Act of 1917. The Minnesota statute was upheld as a legitimate measure
of cooperation by the state with the United States and also as an exercise
of the state's power to preserve its own peace.
In a field of concurrent authority, such as the militia, whether the
state's power to legislate is subject to merely diminution or extinction
often depends not only upon the extent to which Congress has actually
exercised the power granted to it but also upon the intent of Congress,
manifested either expressly or impliedly, to permit or prohibit coordinate
state legislation. Concededly, state legislation, even in exercise of its
police power, is invalid if it conflicts or interferes with legislation enacted
by Congress in its exercise of a power granted by the Constitution, since
it is ordained that the latter "shall be the supreme law of the land."51
Hence, if state legislation purporting to organize the militia conflicts
49. See Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 995,
especially pages 1009-1013.
50. 254 U. S. 325 (1920); Grant, supra note 49; State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166
N. W. 181 (1918); State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 218, 175 N. W. 589 (1919),
in which it was held that the power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution over the
army and navy and the acts of Congress in execution thereof did not preclude states from
raising by taxation a bonus for soldiers of the state who fought in the first World War,
since the benefit which flowed to all the United States from the services performed was
also a benefit to the state. Also see Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 S. Ct. 419 (1907).
51. U. S. CONST. Art. 6; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352-398 (1913). In
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 74 (1941), noted in (1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 584,
a Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens, with certain exceptions, to register once each year,
pay a registration fee of one dollar, furnish certain information and carry an identification
card was held unconstitutional on the ground that Congress, by enacting the Federal Alien
Registration Act of 1940 "manifested a purpose to do so in such a way as to protect the
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system,
and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance
that might not only affect our international relations but might also generate the very
disloyalty which the law has intended guarding against." See also the recent case, Clover-
leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 (1942).
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with organization legislation enacted by Congress, it is invalid. But
that all state legislation on the subject of the militia is necessarily invalid,
without reference to whether Congress intended to permit or prohibit such
legislation, once it is shown that Congress has acted, cannot be accepted
as an established principle of constitutional law, without disregarding
precedents such as Gilbert v. Minnesota.52 If any general rule can be
derived from the cases, it seems to be this: at least in the absence of a
prohibition by Congress, state legislation will be valid provided it does not
unduly interfere with the realization of the national policies intended to be
promoted or safeguarded by the exercise of the power granted to Con-
gress. It would appear to be an over-simplification to say that the sole
test of the validity of state legislation is whether or not it operates in a
field in which Congress has likewise legislated, pursuant to a power
granted to that body. 3
In the relatively few reported cases dealing with the state's power to
legislate concerning the militia, nothing contrary to the above has been
decided. A case frequently alluded to on the subject is Opinion of the
Justices.4 In that case the Governor of Massachusetts requested the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to advise him whether the state
legislature could constitutionally provide for the enrollment in the militia
of persons other than those enumerated in the Militia Act of 1792.
After briefly tracing the history of the militia clauses the court rendered
the following opinion:
"'Organizing' obviously includes the power of determining who shall compose
the body known as the militia. The general principle is that a militia shall
consist of the ablebodied male citizens. But this description is too vague and
indefinite to be laid down as a practical rule; it requires a provision of positive
law to ascertain the exact age which shall be deemed neither too young nor too
old to come within the description. One body of legislators might think the
suitable ages would be from 18 to 45, others from 16 to 30 or 40, others from 20
to 50. Here the power is given to the general government to fix the age
precisely, and thereby to put an end to doubt and uncertainty; and the power
to determine who shall compose the militia, when executed, equally determines
who shall not be embraced in it, because all not selected are necessarily ex-
cluded."
Dunne v. People55 is another case dealing with the same problem.
52. 254 U. S. 325 (1920) ; Grant, supra note 49; Dickinson, The Functions of Congress
and the Courts in Umpiring the Federal System (1940) 8 GEo. WAsir. L. REV. 1165.
53. ROTTSCHAB EaR, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1939) 89-93.
54. 14 Gray 614 (Mass. 1859).
55. See note 33 supra; see also People ex rel. Leo v. Hill, 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789
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Briefly, the specific question presented was whether the Military Code of
Illinois was constitutionally valid, especially in so far as it related to
organization of the active militia of the state known as the Illinois Na-
tional Guard, the claim being made that it was repugnant to the same
Militia Act of 1792. The court concluded that, in its general scope and
effect, the Military Code was not antagonistic to the Act of Congress,
and that, if in minor matters of detail in organization, some regulations
might be found not in harmony with the organization prescribed by
Congress, the most that could be said would be that they would 'give
way to the paramount laws of Congress.
Since in the field of concurrent authority, the general rule seems to
be that state legislation is invalid where Congress has indicated in its
legislation the intention that such legislation be exclusive, does it follow
that the power which Congress possesses to organize the militia includes
the power to provide how it shall not be organized? It must be con-
ceded that Congress may, by positive legislation, provide, either expressly
or by implication, that the method of organization which it prescribes
shall be the only one. For example, Congress may enact legislation
which, though sufficiently inclusive in its composition of the militia, offers
a very scanty and inadequate organization, as it did in 1792, and in
addition enjoin any other organization. Or, as would appear to be the
case with present legislation, 56 Congress may provide for the organization
of a select class of the primary militia, and, expressly or by implication,
indicate its will that such organized militia shall be the only one. How-
(1891); Ansley v. Timmons, 3 McCord (S. C.) 329 (1825) ; U. S. ex rel. Gillett v. Dern,
74 F. (2d) 485, 488 (App. D. C. 1934). The constitutionality of the Illinois Military Code
was also challenged in the United States Supreme Court on similar grounds in Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886). In that case the defendant was convicted under a section
of the Military Code making it unlawful for any body of men, other than the organized
volunteer militia of the state, to associate together as a military organization without a
license from the governor. The court upheld this particular section as a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power, without passing upon the other sections of the Code dealing
with organization of the militia, which the court found were separable.
56. The National Defense Act of 1916 as amended, 39 STAT. 197, 32 U. S. C. A. § 1
(1916) declares that "the militia of the United States shall consist of able-bodied male
citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have de-
clared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than
eighteen years of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years
of age, and said militia shall be divided into three classes, the National Guard, the Naval
Militia, and the Unorganized Militia." Subsequent sections provide for the organization
of the National Guard, and indicate the intention that the National Guard and the Naval
Militia shall constitute the only organized militia of the United States, especially 39
STAT. 198, 32 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1916), cited supra, note 28 and 29.
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ever, and now we reach the crux of the problem, would such a prohibition
deprive the individual states of the sovereign power, which they possessed
before the adoption of the Constitution, to maintain their own guard or
defense units, by whatever name called, for their own defense and to aid,
if necessary, in the enforcement of their own laws?
It must be remembered that the Constitution, though it enumerates
the powers conferred upon the Federal Government, contains no grant
of power to the states. Under the Constitution the states retained those
powers which they possessed as sovereign states before its adoption,
except in so far as such powers are granted to the Federal government.
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the People." 7 The clause giving Congress the power to organize the
militia, read in connection with the clause which immediately precedes,
empowering Congress to call forth the militia for the three designated
purposes, on its face appears to be complementary to, and in aid of, the
preceding clause. In other words Congress was given paramount
authority to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia
solely in order to render it an effective and unified military force should
the national exigency require its call. Until such call, the militia was
intended to remain under the supervision, training and control of the
states, to be employed for purely intra-state purposes. The only apparent
restriction upon state control of the militia is that it will not be
permitted to clash with federal supremacy if such control will lessen
the efficiency of the militia for eventual federal service."8 The policy
motivating this grant of power to Congress would seem to mark out the
ultimate reach of Congressional power. Granting that under the expand-
ing concept of implied powers, the organizing power of Congress may
extend farther than was realized at the time of the Constitution's adoption,
the fact remains that this power has its limits. A point must be reached
where the power of Congress ends and that of the states begins. Pre-
scinding from the provision relating to troops (which we have seen does
not apply), there seems to be nothing within the four corners of the
Constitution which expressly empowers Congress to prohibit the states
from organizing their own defense units. The Second Amendment
apparently sanctions such action by the states. The inference that
57. U. S. CONST. AMEND. X. See Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in
Constitutional Law (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 137.
58. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886) ; Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94,
103 (1940); United States ex rel. Gillett v. Dern, 74 F. (2d) 485, 487 (App. D. C. 1934).
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the power to organize begets the power to disorganize (for that is what
such a prohibition would amount to) appears to rest upon the premise
that the power to organize the able-bodied male population of the states
for the limited purposes specified in the Constitution carries with it by
implication vast power to dictate to the states the regulation of the
citizenry of the states, even to the point of prohibiting their use for
purely local functions.
Let us test this premise. Now potentially the militia consists of
every able-bodied male, and conceivably Congress might, as it has come
near doing, declare every such male a member of the militia. Assuming
it to be practicable, Congress might then organize this vast body of
manpower into military units, specify what arms each should have, and
prescribe a complete and detailed discipline for their training. In other
words, let us envisage a case where Congress has exercised to the fullest
extent its power under the Constitution. Until this militia has been called
into the service of the United States, its members remain subject in
every respect to any legitimate exercise of the state's authority. These
militiamen are citizens of the state, and like other civilians, they remain
subject to the state's laws, civil and criminal; they may be called upon
to enforce the laws of the state; they may be employed as its policemen,
fire-fighters or civilian defense workers. In other words they may be
made subject to any police regulation of the state and employed in any
capacity by the state which does not interfere with their organization
and training as militiamen or lessen their efficiency for eventual federal
service. With this latter qualification, it may be asked what authority
or interest has Congress to question the service they render to the state,
so long as they remain properly organized, armed and trained according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress? It would be unsafe to attempt
to specify the limits of federal power under the paramount prerogative
it possesses to provide for the organization and discipline of the militia,
but even the most extreme advocate of nationalism would concede there
must be some limit to the power of Congress in this respect, beyond
which federal action impinges upon the residuary sovereignty of the
states. When all the militia of a state has been organized by Congress,
as hypothetically assumed above, the state may unquestionably use such
organized units for its own defense until they are drafted into federal
service. When, as is the case under existing legislation organizing the
militia, only a limited portion are organized, then there appears to be
no constitutional barrier to the state under its authority and without
permission from Congress, by conscription or voluntary enlistment,
forming the remainder into such guard or defense units as it deems
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necessary. Opinion of the Justices has been cited as invalidating the
foregoing conclusion and lending support to the contention that Con-
gressional consent is required for the maintenance of an organization,
military in appearance and character (such as the various state guard
units), not part of the militia organized under the laws of Congress.
Quite to the contrary, for after expressing the opinion quoted above, the
court said:
"We do not intend, by the foregoing opinion, to exclude the existence of a
power in the state to provide by law for arming and equipping other bodies
of men, for special service of keeping guard, and making defense, under special
exigencies, or otherwise, in any case not coming within the prohibition of that
clause in the Constitution, art. 1, § 10, which withholds from the State the
power to 'keep troops'; but such bodies, however armed or organized, could
not be deemed any part of 'the Militia,' as contemplated and understood in the
Constitution and laws of Massachusetts and of the United States, and, as we
understand, in the question propounded for our consideration.!' 9
We all know that the provisions of the Constitution, intentionally
general in phraseology, are applied today in situations not within the
prevision of the framers. Increased social and economic integration of
the nation has necessitated national action in new areas, where state power
has proven inadequate to cope successfully with existing problems. Par-
ticularly through the instrumentality of the commerce clause, Congress
has been sustained in its power to cure ills, which, while localized in
cause, are national in effect, and in certain instances, prohibition has
been deemed a proper exercise of the power to regulate. ° But an infer-
ence of a prohibitory power in such a field does not compel its acceptance
in unrelated fields, where similar necessity for drawing the inference
does not obtain. Although the powers granted to Congress follow one
another in the same section of the Constitution, any attempt to analyze
the constructions they have received in the courts for the purpose of
reasoning by analogy to the possible extent of the power granted in
the militia clauses would serve no useful purpose. Any such analogical
treatment must necessarily be imperfect. For instance, the war power
is more extensive in the field it covers than the power conferred over the
militia.6 The power to regulate foreign commerce, though found in the
59. Opinion of the Justices, supra note 54 at 619; see also Ansley v. Timmons, 3 McCord
(S. C.) 329 (1825).
60. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 113 (1941) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38
(1939); 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1928) 52;
Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Conmerce (1933) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 477.
61. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 149 (1919); Ashwander
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same clause with the power to regulate commerce between the states,
seems less restricted since it draws support from other powers;62 in
one case the probability of an asserted conflict with state rights is negli-
gible, in the other more apparent. TJhe states, more and more, may be
losing their character as social and economic units, yet, while this Con-
stitution continues, they remain political units, however limited in power
they may be. 3 Political sovereignty may today be deemed to reside in
the people, but the states retain a residue of sovereignty, recognized in
our dual form of government. When federal action has tended to frustrate
or nullify the power of the state derived from this sovereignty, the action
has failed. The power to tax is of the essence of sovereignty6 4 and
federal encroachment upon this power has been restrained. 65
Research has failed to disclose authoritative interpretation of the mili-
tia clauses in respect to the power of Congress to interdict state military
establishments. Foundation in fact may exist for the implication of such
power, but one is left with the impression that those who have asserted
it have leaped from recognition of one power, the one to organize, to the
affirmation of another, the one to prohibit, without pausing to search for
a nexus bridging the two concepts. In the case of interstate commerce,
prohibition, having some relation to the policy underlying the grant of
regulatory power, has been sustained. In the case of the militia no per-
ceptible connection exists between a ban on state military organizations
and the grant of power to enact legislation for the organization, arming
and discipline of the militia.
It is unsafe to reason from a theoretically possible abuse of power to
an absence of power. Yet such a circumstance may be taken into con-
sideration as a factor in determining the intent with which a plan of
government such as ours was formulated. The contention that Congres-
sional permission is required by the states for the organization of their
own guard units, carried to its logical extreme, would vest Congress with
power, arbitrarily and without relation to the legitimate exercise of any
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 326 (1935); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 62 Sup. Ct. 581, 589-590 (1942).
62. 2 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 60 at § 417. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 315-318 (1936).
63. A succinct, but all the same comprehensive, review of the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court bearing upon the distribution of powers between the nation and states may
be found in Dodd, The Decreasing Importance of State Lines (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 78.
64. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428 (U. S. 1819); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U. S. 357, 366 (1939).
65. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Imp. Dist., 298 U. S. 513 (1936) ; cf. United States
v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27 (1938).
1942]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
other power, to abolish the militia of the several states and thereby
nullify the second principle of the Bill of Rights. When we call to mind
the atmosphere of misgiving and reassurance and final compromise which
attended the genesis and birth of the Constitution, it seems safe to say
that the state's power of defense, within constitutional limits, was scarcely
at that time considered to be so illusory. Nor has any palpably changed
condition, affecting the national interest, intervened between then and
now which would disclose to view a latent power, never before discerned,
but which is now perceived always to have been present.
The conclusion, which this paper suggests, that the states retain the
inherent power of self-defense which they possessed prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, is not weakened by the fact that the Constitution
places upon the National Government the duty to protect the states
against invasion, and when the states apply for such aid, against domestic
violence.66 It has been decided that the President shall be the sole
judge whether the National Government shall come to the aid of the state
claiming protection under the Constitution.67 The element of time or
other circumstances may prevent the prompt sending of such aid,68 and
in any event, while the ultimate obligation of protection may rest upon
the National Government, there is nothing in the Constitution to indicate
that the states were to be left entirely dependent upon the national gov-
ernment for their own defense.69
It must not be supposed that any of the views expressed above are
intended to deny in the slightest degree to Congress the supreme power
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States."7 Under the grant
66. U. S. CONST. Art. IV § 4. See SEN. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) on
Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances. This Document presents a detailed review of the
occasions in our history in which this clause of the Constitution was invoked.
67. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42-43 (U. S. 1849); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19
(U. S. 1827); SEN. Doc. No. 263, 220.
68. Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, have warned
that regular troops may not be available for local defense purposes. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1942, p. 1, col. 3 and March 3, 1942, p: 4, col. 2.
69. "Unquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an armed insur-
rection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the
existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions,
and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government." Taney, Ch. J.,
in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 45 (U. S. 1849). See also Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 260 (1934) ; Ansel v. Timmons, 3 McCord (S. C.)
329, 332 (1825).
70. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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of power to wage war and to raise and support armies and maintain a
navy, Congress is fully competent to legislate for the protection of the
national interest, even though such legislation may result in a diminution
or total extinction of some area in which the power of the individual
states might otherwise operate. The right of the states to maintain their
own militia for their own purposes must give way to the dominant power
of Congress to raise armies.71 Today no one questions the power of Con-
gress to draft into war service every member of the militia to the last
man and, if need be, women and others not forming a part of the militia.
Time and again events have revealed the foresight of those who framed
the Constitution. In granting Congress the power to raise armies this is
particularly true. The limitations contained in the militia clauses of the
Constitution made them an unworkable and ineffectual instrument for
real national defense.7' Recent history has furnished graphic evidence
of the truth of the adage that offense may be the best form of defense.
The militia organized by Congress, that is the National Guard in its
character as state militia, may be called only in the three exigencies
specified in the Constitution and even when called into Federal service
they may not be sent out of the country.73 But no such limitations fetter
Congress in the exercise of its powers to raise armies, and it was under
the clause of the Constitution granting that power that Congress even-
tually formulated the basis for the effective military force which was
developed in time of peace. 74
It should also be made clear that, even assuming the existing state
guard units are not members of the organized militia as constituted by
Congress,7" they will become such by the simple expedient of a Con-
gressional enactment legislating them into the organized militia. Such
units will then, of course, be subject to the call of the President for duty
71. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 381-388 (1918) cited supra note 12;
Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 408 (U. S. 1871); Kneedler v. Lane; Burroughs v. Peyton;
Ex parte Coupland, all cited supra note 37; Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 353 (1862) ; Ansell,
Status of State Militia under the Hay Bill (1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 712.
72. Wiener, supra note 27.
73. 29 Op. Anr'Y GEN. (1912) 322 quoted in SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW AND DEFENSE
LEG sLATION (1941) 70.
74. Wiener, supra note 27; MacChesney, National Defense-Constitutionality of Pending
Legislation (1916) 64 U. oF PA. L. REV_ 347 and 449; Ansell, supra note 71.
75. It might be inferred from the provisions of 55 STAT. 628, 32 U. S. C. A. § 194 (Supp.
1941) supra note 29, that the military forces authorized in that statute are intended by
Congress to be a part of the organized militia. However, this seems unlikely in view of
the fact that 39 STAT. 197, 32 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1916) supra note 56, fails to exclude them
from the unorganized militia.
1942]
192 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
"to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions".7" Or pursuant to its extensive war power or the power to
raise armies, Congress may see fit to organize, under federal control, a
national home guard, a counterpart to the one existing in England.
7
In short Congress has ample power, under the Constitution, to provide
for both national and purely local defense. However, at least until
Congress, in the exercise of the power granted to it in the Constitution,
fully occupies the field, confusion may exist among state officials charged
with the responsibility for local defense on the question whether or not
the power of the individual states to organize their own defense establish-
ments depends, for its exercise, upon the consent of Congress. Solely in
an effort to furnish some clarification of the issues involved, the views
expressed in this paper have been presented.
76. A change would be required in the law, since 54 STAT. 1206, 32 U. S. C. A. § 194
(Supp. 1941) supra note 29, presently provides that such organizations shall not be called as
units into the military service of the United States.
77. This was done during the last War, the force being known as the United States
Guards. See 1 REP. SEc'Y WAR (1918) 1146-67; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 7 (1921).
